Zeitenwende Kaputt?!

The Defeat, or at Least a Failure, of Germany's Geopolitical Reorientation

Czytaj ten artykuł:  po polsku


When German Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced the Zeitenwende on February 27, 2022, it was meant to be a watershed moment in German foreign and security policy. In the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Scholz announced that Germany would turn away from its previous approach based on peaceful coexistence with Russia and begin investing in defense and cooperation with NATO.

This apparent departure from traditional German eastern policy was so profound that in late 2022, “Zeitenwende” became the German word of the year for 2022, and Scholz was invited to develop his concept before an English-speaking audience at the prestigious Foreign Affairs.

Chancellor Olaf Scholz (Graphics: A. Wozniewicz)

Today, it is known that the decision to "turn" was dictated not only by Russia's aggression, but also by the belief that Ukraine would quickly fall, which raised fears that Germany would have to face an aggressive Russia, located on the borders of the European Union.

The plan included increased defense spending, a more active role for Germany in international alliances, and a revamp of energy policy. However, more than two years later, many critics note that rather than being a key geopolitical shift, Zeitenwende was a failure in its attempt to redefine Germany's role in the world.

“The German Zeitenwende is a disaster,” wrote Dr. Benjamin Tallis, incidentally the previous head of the working group that analyzed the promised changes at the German Society for Foreign Policy (DGAP), in his article under the telling title “The End of Zeitenwende”:

Evaluating the results of the “Zeitenwende,” Germany’s supposed security transformation, shows that it has failed. … the Zeitenwende, proclaimed by Chancellor Olaf Scholz, no longer carries political force and should be abandoned as a term of use.

Why did this ambitious project not produce the expected results?

Background to the Concept of Zeitenwende

Zeitenwende, which can be translated as "turning point" or "change of era", was supposed to be Germany's response to a new geopolitical reality in which Europe and the world were becoming destabilized by events such as the war in Ukraine, tensions with China, and changes in relations with the U.S. under the administration of Donald Trump and – later – Joe Biden.

Chancellor Scholz announced the Zeitenwende in the Bundestag shortly after the Russian invasion of Ukraine began, signaling that Germany understood that its previous policy towards Russia was inadequate in the face of changing circumstances.

The main assumptions of the concept included:

  • Increased defense spending – Scholz pledged that Germany will spend €100 billion to modernize its armed forces.
  • Reorientation of energy policy – ​​ending dependence on Russian energy resources, especially gas, while maintaining commitment to achieving climate goals.
  • Growing Germany’s role in NATO – Scholz announced a more proactive approach to collective defense, military cooperation with alliance partners and support for Ukraine.
  • Tougher approach towards Russia and other dictatorships.

These elements were heralded as steps towards a more assertive foreign policy and a break with the traditional German approach based on dialogue and partnership with Russia. Let us add that for the Poles, every German dialogue and partnership with Russia always ended badly, so a retreat from the traditional policy of reaching an agreement behind Polish backs was expected with some hope.

Dr. Tallis proves in his article, in a devastating way for Scholz, that not a single one of these points has been realized, and that actual actions have nothing to do with the initial promises.

Reasons for the Failure of the Zeitenwende

Although ambitious in concept, the Zeitenwende concept encountered a number of problems that effectively prevented its implementation.

  1. Insufficient implementation of defense reforms

    A key element of the Zeitenwende was the increase in Germany's defense capabilities, which were not only to strengthen the German army but also to raise the capabilities of NATO as a whole. Scholz's commitment to allocate 100 billion euros to modernize the armed forces was intended to heal the Bundeswehr, which had been neglected for years. Unfortunately, this process was beset by numerous problems.

    The German bureaucracy for purchasing military equipment has proven slow and complicated. The introduction of new weapons systems, including the advanced F-35 fighter jet, has been delayed by procedural complexities and a lack of coordination.

    Second, despite Scholz’s promises, Germany still has trouble meeting its NATO commitment to spend 2% of GDP on defense. Germany’s defense spending in 2023 has yet to reach that level, drawing criticism from both domestic and allied sources.

    In turn, from the perspective of France, which had the ambition to become a pillar of European defence, leaving Germany to play the role of economic leader, the increase in spending on the Bundeswehr without a corresponding increase in cooperation with the French industry and army became a reason for disappointment.

    In any case, the lack of real progress in modernizing the Bundeswehr, which lacks basic equipment such as helicopters, tanks or modern communications systems, has undermined Germany's credibility as a military leader in Europe.

  2. Difficulties in breaking energy dependence on Russia

    One of the most important pillars of the Zeitenwende was to end Germany's dependence on Russian energy resources. Before the war in Ukraine, Russia was the main supplier of gas, oil and coal to Germany, which made the German economy heavily dependent on Russian resources. Scholz announced that the Zeitenwende meant ending this dependence and accelerating the energy transformation based on renewable energy sources.

    Germany has made significant steps to reduce its dependence on Russian energy resources, but completely severing this relationship is a complicated and not yet fully completed process.

    The rapid severance of Russian gas led to a sharp increase in energy prices, which in turn had a negative impact on the German economy. Many German industrialists feared that the energy transformation, although necessary, would lead to higher production costs and weaken Germany's competitiveness on international markets.

    In addition, the difficulties in developing alternative energy sources such as LNG (liquefied natural gas) have been hampered by local protests and bureaucracy. Germany still has to import raw materials from other countries, including liquefied natural gas from the US, crude oil from Norway and Qatar, and coal from Australia and South Africa.

  3. Foreign policy inconsistency towards Russia and China

    The Zeitenwende was also supposed to involve a fundamental change in Germany's approach to relations with Russia. For decades, German politics had been dominated by the so-called Ostpolitik, which aimed to pursue dialogue and cooperation with Moscow. Scholz announced that the Zeitenwende would be a break with that tradition, but in practice, German actions were inconsistent.

    Although Germany supported sanctions on Russia and increased military support for Ukraine, Scholz's initial actions were seen as uncertain. The chancellor delayed delivering modern Leopard tanks to Ukraine, which drew criticism from other NATO countries, especially Poland and the Baltic states, which expected Berlin to act more decisively.

    A similar problem occurred in relations with China. Zeitenwende assumed a more decisive stance against the growing influence of Beijing, especially in the context of protecting international trade and respecting human rights. Germany, as one of China's largest trading partners, had to balance economic interests with geopolitical concerns. Scholz faced criticism that his policy towards China was too soft, which raised doubts about a real change of course under Zeitenwende.

  4. No political consensus

    The concept of Zeitenwende was a subject of dispute within German politics from the very beginning. Although Scholz tried to convince his coalition partners of a common vision, in reality the SPD, the Greens and the FDP differed in their approach to key issues related to foreign policy and defence.

    The SPD, traditionally more inclined to dialogue with Russia, has often been criticized for its lack of a clear political line. The Greens, on the other hand, have sought a more decisive stance towards Moscow, but their priority has been the energy transition, which has made compromise difficult.

Has the Zeitenwende Been Realised?

The Zeitenwende concept aimed to fundamentally reorient Germany's geopolitical position, responding to new threats from Russia and the need to strengthen cooperation with NATO and end dependence on energy resources from Russia. However, the implementation of this project encountered numerous problems, from bureaucratic delays, through difficulties in the energy transformation, to a lack of coherence in foreign policy.

  1. Modernization of the armed forces

    One of the main goals of the Zeitenwende was to increase defense spending. Germany established a special fund of 100 billion euros to modernize the Bundeswehr, a step towards achieving NATO's goal of spending 2% of GDP on defense. Germany has made progress in increasing its military budget by 2023, but there are concerns that this increase may not be sustained once the fund is exhausted in 2027. In addition, the process of modernizing the armed forces has been slow due to bureaucratic and tendering problems.

  2. Energy dependence

    The biggest success of the Zeitenwende was the end of energy dependence on Russian gas. In 2022, Germany completely stopped importing gas from Russia, which happened sooner than expected. Investment was made in the development of LNG infrastructure to import gas from other sources, such as Norway, Qatar and the United States. However, new challenges are emerging, such as new dependencies on authoritarian countries, such as Qatar, which is causing controversy.

  3. Support for Ukraine and foreign policy

    Germany, which initially refused to supply heavy equipment to Ukraine and offered to donate 5,000 helmets instead, eventually provided significant military support, becoming one of the country’s top suppliers of military equipment after the U.S. However, Scholz was criticized for initially being slow to deliver some weapons systems, such as Leopard tanks, causing frustration among allies.

    In addition, Germany, although it has changed its policy towards Russia, has not completely broken with its old approach to dialogue with Moscow, which is causing concern in Central and Eastern Europe, including Poland. Scholz initially resisted the delivery of tanks, then combat aircraft, and now Taurus cruise missiles.

    German Chancellor Olaf Scholz's refusal to send Taurus missiles to Ukraine testifies to the deep concern that still prevails in Germany about leading defence and security policy in Europe and, in particular, about countering Russian expansionism.

    Paul Lever, former British ambassador to Germany, puts it this way:

    [Scholz] … still cannot free himself from one of the traditional weaknesses of his party's security policy: excessive sensitivity to Russia's concerns and an unwillingness to accept that there are times when certain issues must be resolved on the battlefield rather than at the negotiating table.

  4. Internal and political problems

    Despite the announced changes, Scholz’s policies have often encountered internal disputes within the ruling coalition and criticism for the slow pace of reforms. The process of reorienting foreign and defense policy, as well as the further development of green energy, is still uncertain and indecisive.

    There is also a worrying gulf between West and East Germany on support for Ukraine and cooperation with Russia, which could translate into electoral success for parties opposed to drastic policy changes on these issues in regional and European elections. East Germany (formerly the GDR) is much more sympathetic to Russia’s actions. The years of communist indoctrination have taken their toll.

    Benjamin Tallis again:

    Germany now needs a comprehensive strategic reset – and bold leadership in domestic and foreign policy – ​​to arrest its decline and ensure its security, prosperity and democracy. (…)

    Continuing to use the term Zeitenwende is counterproductive because it creates the appearance that real changes are taking place, when in fact they are needed more than ever.

    Chancellor Scholz's leadership is currently no guarantee of achieving the needed breakthrough. It seems that his mandate as chancellor is slowly expiring, but it is not certain which forces on the German political scene will take the initiative.

  5. Germany's patronizing approach

    There are no visible changes in Germany's approach to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, despite demands to treat them as equal partners. It turned out that the authorities of these countries understood and assessed Russia's strategy more accurately, and rightly considered the United States to be the only guarantor of security in Europe.

    Nevertheless, although some of the German political elite began to see the value of their analyses and actions, this did not translate into taking their opinions into account to a sufficient degree in shaping Berlin's policy. Examples of this include the approach to Ukraine's membership in NATO or the formulation of a new European policy towards Russia.

Conclusions

In summary, the implementation of the Zeitenwende concept, announced by Chancellor Olaf Scholz in 2022, has been mixed and far from a complete success. Zeitenwende was supposed to mean a “breakthrough,” a historical “turning point,” and so far it has turned out to be just a continuation of Germany’s cautious and overly sensitive policy towards Russia. Whether, as Poles, we really want a dramatic increase in Germany’s importance and power on the international stage is a separate issue, which we have already written about.




Sources/Bibliography:


It is clear that that Germany recognizes its responsibility for the outbreak of World War II and the destruction it caused, and it is clear that no serious reparations have been paid to Poland in connection with this aggression. These are facts, and «there is no point in arguing about the facts».

Read more...

Polish consulates in the United States encourage you to support the efforts of Arkadiusz Mularczyk, MP and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, who held a series of meetings with senators and congressmen in the US Congress. The purpose of these meetings was to obtain support in two aspects: assistance for Ukraine and assistance of the United States to support Polish claims for German reparations for Poland.

Read more...
Free the Leopards
Waldemar Biniecki

However, it is difficult to understand the delay of German decisions regarding the supply of heavy equipment to Ukraine. Most of the German media have trouble understanding their chancellor's decision. But as US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said in his speech: "Ukrainians are looking at us, Putin is looking at us, and history is looking at us."

Read more...
Zeitenwende
The Turning Point
Waldemar Biniecki

Germany, not wanting to allow any alternative geostrategic project to be created in the eastern part of Europe, is successively blocking the flow of funds to Poland to prevent the construction of a competing construct: North-South.

Read more...

While in the German press the current Chancellor Scholz is said to be performing "Eiertanz" — a dance with eggs: two steps forward, one step back — and about Schroder, that he is Putin's puppet, the media are very restrained about the former Chancellor Angela Merkel. She herself is absent from political life, especially after the outbreak of the war in Ukraine.

Read more...